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offered an enlightening contribution to the subject in hand. The reviewer may 
finally be permitted to express a wish and a hope. Due to the fact that K. L. 
Thai, dealing with Zen Buddhism, hails from Vietnam and that Vietnam has 
its own Zen culture and history which even antedates that of Japan by roughly 
speaking 600 years—for western students of Buddhism quite a surprise—one 
feels prompted to request and wish in earnest that she and other qualified Viet­
namese scholars, authors and poets try their best and eventually succeed in 
making accessible to the scholarly world and the interested general public the 
grandeur of the indigenous Zen tradition of Vietnam; for what is known of it 
outside Vietnam is next to nothing.
Bhikkhu PAsAdika
THE NOTHINGNESS BEYOND GOD: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Nishida KitarO. By Robert E. Carter. Paragon House, 
1989. xxvii + 191 pp., with a bibliography and index. ISBN 1-55778- 
072-2
More than twenty years have passed since Nishida Kitard’s maiden work was 
translated into English by V. H. Viglielmo under the title A Study of Good. 
Since then, Western scholars in increasing numbers have been turning their at­
tention to Nishida’s philosophy, as well as to the thought of other thinkers of 
the so-called Kyoto School centered at Kyoto University. There have appeared 
recently in the West two books which try to come to grips with the studies in 
this field. One of them is Absolutes Nichts, published by Hans Waldenfels in 
1976. The other is The Nothingness beyond God by R. E. Carter. I should like 
to offer some comments on the latter.
The Nothingness beyond God consists of six chapters, devoted to the topics 
of “pure experience,*’ the logic of basho,” “self-contradictory identity,” 
“God and Nothingness,” “religion and morality,” and “value, ethics, and 
feeling.”
According to Professor Carter, Nishida, while firmly standing within Zen 
Buddhist tradition, endeavoured to give expression to his “passion for render­
ing Buddhist paradoxical utterance, or the Zen experience of immediacy 
understandable” by having recourse to or through the medium of the “several 
languages of Western philosophy” (xiii). Professor Carter rightly points out 
that, even though there is no doubt that Nishida’s philosophy favors a Zen- 
oriented perspective, he is “a bridge between East and West precisely because 
he identifies himself with neither alleged perspective and sees more often than 
most that the work of philosophy is neither Eastern nor Western, but takes as
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its material the overlapping insights of people anywhere in the world, and pro­
duces from that material a totality of thought transcending any particular 
cultural perspectives** (p. 144).
It is well-known that Nishida’s philosophy can be characterized as “the 
basho of absolute nothingness.’’ It can be said that this term constitutes one 
of the most important ideas through which to find a way to an understanding 
of his philosophy. Professor Carter seems to have tried to clarify the term en­
tirely in line with the Zen Buddhist tradition which says that, in the midst of 
our daily life where we see things with our eyes, the eye does not see the eye. 
We can formulate this matter in such a way that the eye is an eye precisely 
because it is not an eye. For, in spite of the fact that the raison d’etre of an eye 
consists in seeing, it is here said not to “see” the eye itself. With this perspec­
tive in mind, we must say that the raison d’etre of an eye precisely consists in 
not seeing. According to Zen Buddhism, at the ground of these ways of think­
ing lies the “logic of soku-hi." Professor Carter follows D.T. Suzuki's for­
mulation of this logic: “A is A; A is not-A; therefore A is A” (p. 59). By ap­
pealing to this logic, Zen Buddhism tries to give expression to “the absolute 
identification of the is and the is not" (p. 59). Moreover, Professor Carter 
holds the view that this absolute identification is nothing else than absolute 
nothingness. Just because absolute nothingness is that by virtue of which the 
eye is said not to see an eye in the midst of its seeing everything in daily life, it 
cannot be established in separation or apart from this world in which we are 
born, act, and die. Buddhism tries to describe this truth in terms of “Nirvana 
is at the same time samsara." As Professor Carter emphasizes, Nishida’s 
philosophy is an attempt to formulate this characteristic Mahayana principle 
and to render it understandable by employing the languages of Western 
philosophy.
It is generally maintained that one of the essential features of Nishida’s 
philosophy can be expressed by means of “the identity of absolute contradic­
tories.” Tanabe Hajime, though a successor to Nishida at Kyoto University, 
leveled strong criticisms against him, pointing out that, even though Nishida 
busies himself speaking of contradictories, his arguments terminate in a 
mystical intuition of the self-identical whole inclusive of these contradictories 
which is, in the final analysis, based on the self-identical logic of reason. If 
Tanabe’s interpretation is tenable, there is no other alternative but to con­
clude that Nishida’s philosophy deviates from the Buddhist thesis that nirvana 
is at the same time samsara, just because the alleged self-identical whole is, in 
this case, thought to arise independently of this world in which contradictories 
occur. In an attempt to interpret this key term of Nishida’s philosophy Pro­
fessor Carter is careful to avoid this pitfail himself. He rightly points out that 
“Nishida’s strength is that he did not attempt to resolve the contradictions of
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experience, but saw them as inescapable as descriptions of the way the world 
is, as it is known by us. The result is not synthesis, but a unity-in-contradic- 
tion, and identity-of-opposites” (p. 70).
Professor Carter points out elsewhere in the book that in order to do justice 
to what Nishida wants to convey by means of “the self-identity of absolute 
contradictories,” we must take into consideration “the dynamical tension” 
(p. 62) of these contradictories instead of their synthesis. He repeatedly refers 
to this tension in terms of “double aperture.”
By virtue of the fact that absolute nothingness is established in the midst of 
our daily life as the dynamical tension of contradictories, it makes its ap­
pearance through all the things in this world as “forms of the formless.” For 
this reason, Professor Carter insists that it is “neither transcendent nor imma­
nent in the Western sense of these terms,” (p. 86) and goes on to say that “at 
the least, nothingness is both transcendent and immanent, and at most 
neither, because it it beyond (or different from) these categories” (p. 86).
The reader may at first be somewhat puzzled by the title The Nothingness 
beyond God. Referring to the relation which nothingness bears to the world, 
Carter says that it is both transcendent and immanent. He describes it in terms 
of the “immanently transcendent” in contradistinction to the “transcendent 
transcendence” which characterizes “the Judeo-Christian (and typically 
Western) account of the man/God relationship” (p. 119). According to the 
Western tradition, God is usually taken “to be (out there) somehow, as a 
transcendent objective absolute, who is distinctly separate from us, even 
spatially” (p. 119). By contrast, on the grounds that absolute nothingness is 
both transcendent and immanent, it is regarded as that “out of which even 
God arises” (p. 85). This is the reason why Professor Carter regards the 
nothingness as beyond God. With regard to the view that nothingness is an un­
differentiated whole inclusive of both being and non-being, he says that 
“Nothingness is the non-dualistic whole which is as it is, and before it is sliced 
up by the dualistic logic of being and non-being” (p. 83).
Finally 1 would like to offer a few words of criticisms regarding Professor 
Carter’s interpretation of Nishida’s philosophy. He seems to be inconsistent 
in arguing on the one hand that while nothingness can be characterized in 
terms of “the identity of absolute contradictories,” the term “identity” 
should not be taken in this case as indicating synthesis, while stating on the 
other that nothingness is a whole inclusive of both being and non-being.
Professor Carter falls victim to another inconsistency, when, while saying 
that “nothingness is the world as contradictory identity” (p. 69) he states that 
self is also the basho of absolute nothingness. I am convinced that the reason 
for this lies in his attempt to interpret Nishida’s philosophy too closely in line 
with Zen Buddhism. Nishida himself warns us to guard against this tempta-
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tion when he said, “I carry on my arguments not from a standpoint of 
religious experience but on the basis of the thoroughgoing logical analysis 
about the historical reality. Furthermore, the purpose of my arguments con­
sists not in merely analysing its [static] structure but in pursuing its [dynamic] 
movement” (Nishida ZenshO, Vol 9, p. 57).
Professor Carter is right in repeatedly pointing out that “the self is the 
basho” (p. 146) where nothingness, in which absolute contradictories are said 
to be self-identical, arises. But in order that the self may be the basho of this 
kind, it cannot be separated from the historical world wherein we are born, 
act, and die, and which must be “something like the contradictory self-identi­
ty of the many and the one” (p. 58. Zenshtl, Vol 12, p. 290). As regards the 
relation between the historical world and the self, Nishida holds a view such as 
this: The historical world makes a constant advance from the created to the 
creating in a contradictory-self-identity-fashion of the many and the one, 
through the medium of the self, which is also said to be in contradictory self­
identity in its self-creating activities, insofar as it is determined by its own 
historical world, and at the same time turns out to be a determining agent in 
its relation to this world. This mutual dialectical relation between the world 
and the self takes place “here and now,” that is to say, at each moment in 
which the world thus makes a creative advancement. Nishida often argues that 
absolute nothingness realizes itself in this very moment.
Attention should be paid to the fact that the term “realize” has a double 
meaning: It means that something makes its appearance, and thus realizes 
itself; and also that a human being understands and thus gets a grip on this 
something. When Nishida speaks of the inverse correspondence between 
nothingness and the world or between nothingness and the self, he has in mind 
the “realization” of nothingness in the above-mentioned sense. I regret that 
Professor Carter does not refer to this crucial issue, which Nishida arrived at 
in the last stage of his philosophical development.
Yamamoto Seisaku
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